Justice Alan B. Handler: A Man of Reason
The Hon. VirginiaA. Long
For all the world, on September 8, 1999, when I assumed Justice
Handler's seat on the NewJersey Supreme Court, an irrevocable link
was forged between us. Closer scrutiny of that link reveals a
pentimento: an underlying bond, longer and deeper than mere
accession would ordinarily dictate.
We met on a perfect spring day in 1965. He was the First
Assistant Attorney General, and I was a second-year law student
interviewing for a summer clerkship in the Division of Law. At our
meeting, which included, among other things, the subjects of movies
and sports (I did the movies; he did the sports), he was, as he is today,
glitteringly intellectual, wry, witty, self-effacing, and plainly lit from
within. After the meeting, the job that had previously seemed merely
a good idea to me became an object of intense desire. Luckily, he
hired me and later invited me back and swore me into my first
position as a lawyer.
In those days, there were no Assistant Attorneys General, no
Deputy Assistants, and no Section Chiefs. Alan Handler chose the
deputies and oversaw us. His oversight included personal review of
all legal documents issuing from the office, particularly appellate
briefs, which he addressed with unusual vigor and the eye of a great
editor. He could expose the limitations of any argument on sight
and mentally restructure a brief without ever lifting a pencil. He
could make remarkable improvements by merely eliding a word here
or adding one there.
In the process, he was entirely encouraging and kind. No young
lawyer ever left his office crushed or defeated, even if a rewrite was in
order. A student of human nature once observed that it is wise to
keep away from people who belittle your ambitions and cleave to
those great souls who make you believe you can be great. You never
had to keep away from Alan Handler, who fostered and supported
the talents and aspirations of a generation of lawyers by giving us not
only professional experience, but a sense of our own worth and
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potential.
He was also a great teacher. He taught us that decent and
honorable behavior is always in style; that theory and practice are two
essential sides of the same coin; that neither scholarship nor
intuition, standing alone, is adequate; and that a lawyer should speak
and write in his or her own voice because only that voice is powerful
and genuine enough to persuade. Above all, by his example, he
taught us to be kind. Those lessons, which he lives by, have stood me
in good stead during my thirty-four years as a member of the bar.
Thus it is with affection, enthusiasm, and a long history that I have
undertaken to participate in this festschrift.
That said, it is nevertheless a difficult task to summarize a
judicial career such as Justice Handler's, not only because of its
length, but also because of its breadth. Citing any single case
necessarily says too little. For this tribute, however, Justice Handler
was asked to pare down the universe of potential subjects and to
identify particular cases revelatory of his jurisprudential principles.
Among his choices was State v. Hunt,' and I take my cue from him. In
the next few pages, I will try to set forth what it is about the Hunt
opinion that I see as emblematic ofJustice Handler's career.
In 1977, Justice Brennan stressed the importance of state
constitutional law as an independent source of individual freedoms
without which "the full realization of our liberties cannot be
guaranteed."
Hunt exemplifies the invocation of the state
constitution as a "font of individual liberties."0 The case arose
because the police, without a warrant, seized Merrell Hunt's toll
billing records from New Jersey Bell Telephone Company. Hunt
argued that the evidence eventually discovered in his toll billing
records should be excluded.
The majority held that, under the NewJersey Constitution, Hunt
had a protectable privacy interest in toll billing records possessed by
the telephone company.
In so doing, the Court rejected the
5
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland,
which had declared that under the Fourth Amendment there is no
reasonable personal or societal expectation of privacy in dialed

91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv.L REv. 489, 491 (1977).
s Id.

See Hunt, 91 N.J. at 347, 450 A.2d at 956.
5 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
4
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telephone numbers.6 While recognizing the propriety of parallel
interpretations of federal and state constitutional provisions with
similar historical roots and purposes, the Hunt majority based its
divergent interpretation upon the "equities" favoring a New Jersey
citizen's privacy interest, particularly the State's policy of legislative
protection of telephonic communications predating New Jersey's
Constitution of 1947. 7
Justice Handler's famous concurrence in Hunt approved of the
decision of the majority to afford Hunt greater protection under the
New Jersey Constitution than was available under the United States
Constitution.8 Reiterating the principle delineated in PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robini' that each state has a "'sovereign right to
adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution[,]" ' 0 Justice Handler
cited his majority opinion in State v. Schmid' for the proposition that
"'state constitutions exist as a cognate source of individual freedoms
and that state constitutional guarantees of these rights
may indeed
''
surpass the guarantees of the federal [C]onstitution. M
Justice Handler felt constrained, however, to point out the
danger of unprincipled action and condemned "state courts turning
uncritically to their state constitutions for convenient solutions to
problems not readily or obviously found elsewhere." 3 He decried the
"erosion or dilution of constitutional doctrine. 1 4 Justice Handler
cautioned the Court to be mindful of the traditional closeness of
federal and state constitutional theory and of the principle that, while
federal precedents are not controlling, they are nevertheless
important guides on the subjects that they squarely address.' 5
To accommodate these sometimes competing values and to
reduce the randomness of the process, Justice Handler painstakingly
developed a seven-point divergence methodology to identify and
explain the standards for determining when to invoke our state
See id. at 742.
See Hunt, 91 N.J. at 345, 450 A.2d at 955.
8 See id.
at 358, 450 A.2d at 962 (Handler, J., concurring).
9 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
10 Hunt, 91 N.J. at 359, 450 A.2d at 962 (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting
6
7

PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81).
84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
I
Hunt, 91 N.J. at 360, 450 A.2d at 963 (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting
Schmid, 84 N.J. at 553, 423 A.2d at 624).
Is Id. at 361, 450 A.2d at 963 (HandlerJ, concurring).
14 Id.
15 See id. at 363, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler,J., concurring).
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constitution as an independent source for protecting individual
rights. 6 Those criteria include, but are not limited to, textual
language, legislative history, preexisting state law, structural
differences, matters of particular state interest or local concern, state
tradition and history, and public attitudes." Significantly, Justice
Handler declared the rationale for the test he developed: "the
discovery of unique individual rights in a state constitution does not
spring from pure intuition but, rather, from a process that is
reasonable and reasoned." 8
The reverberations from Hunt have been great. In this state, for
example, the Supreme Court has invoked the Hunt divergence
criteria to recognize a "due process right to an entrapment defense
under principles of state constitutional doctrine[;]"' 9 to invalidate the
use of defendant's uncounseled post-indictment statements; 2 to
reject the so-called "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule on
the basis of the privacy interests of our citizens; 2' and to find that the
public and the press have a protectable state constitutional interest in
access to all pre-trial proceedings in criminal prosecutions. Courts
in numerous other jurisdictions have also cited Justice Handler's
opinion in Hunt as a basis for formulating their own divergence
criteria.2
While Justice Handler was not the first New Jersey jurist to
declare that our citizens may be entitled to greater state
constitutional protections than those afforded under the United
States Constitution,24 he was the first to introduce criteria
16

See id. at 364-68, 450 A.2d 965-67 (Handler,J., concurring).

17

See id.

is Hunt, 91 N.J. at 367, 450 A.2d at 967 (Handler,J. concurring).
19 State v.Johnson, 127 N.J. 458, 474, 606 A.2d 315, 323 (1992).
21 See State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 274, 609 A.2d 400, 407 (1992).
21 SeeState v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 146, 519 A.2d 820, 850 (1987).
See State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 57-58, 459 A.2d 641,650 (1983).
See, e.g., Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272, 276 & n.4 (Del. 1998) (citing several
Hunt factors in discussion of "expansion beyond federally guaranteed individual
liberties by a state constitution"); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 n.5 (Utah CL
App. 1990) (referring attorneys to Justice Handler's Hunt factors for instruction on
which points should be developed and analyzed in arguing for innovative
interpretations of a state constitution); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash.
1986) (relying on several ofJustice Handler's Hunt criteria to develop Washington's
own nonexclusive criteria relevant to determining whether, in a given situation, the
state constitution "should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens

than does the United States Constitution").
24 See State v.Johnson 68 N.J. 349, 353-54, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (1975) (rejecting the
United States Supreme Court's conclusion in Schneckoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), that a consent to search isvalid even though defendant did not know he had

20001

A TRIBUTE TO JUSTICEHANDLER

713

justification that provides a measure of precision, consistency,
uniformity, and, ultimately, predictability in the difficult and often
irksome task of deciding when to invoke state constitutional
guarantees. Hunt was thus a watershed in the development of state
constitutional doctrine.2
Hunt is also notable because of what the decision says about
Justice Handler: that he has a deep appreciation of the genius of the
New Jersey Constitution, the fragile boundaries of which (in his
words) "demarcate an implied ethic of public discourse within which
ideologies and interests, through warring, war intelligently and
constructively";" a wholesome respect for individual rights; a devotion
to principle even at the expense of outcome; a wholly generous spirit;
mental and moral clarity; a full comprehension of complex
constitutional theory; and a fundamental recognition of the need to
render theory corporeal or risk relegating it to inaccessibility. The
seven-point methodology of Hunt is a simple and straightforward
vehicle, allowing ordinary mortals the opportunity to apply difficult
principles of constitutional interpretation for the purpose of
protecting the rights of our fellow citizens.
Stylistically, Justice Handler's concurrence in Hunt also speaks
volumes. It is easy reading, made up of apparently effortless, graceful
prose, meticulous and sonorous articulation, and elegant phrasing. It
is evidence that Justice Handler is not only an extraordinary thinker,
but also an unparalleled writer; that he is never reduced to adopting
the formulations of others; and that he speaks in his own voice, not
doomed to a life of tepid half-expression, but, to paraphrase
Emerson, always "insistent on himself, presenting every argument
with the cumulative force of a whole life's cultivation.""8
The
concurrence reveals a man to whom the joy of rational thinking is
a right to withhold consent).
See Leigh A. Morrissey, State Courts Reject Leon on State ConstitutionalGrounds: A
Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 VAND L. REV. 917, 933 n. 113 (1994).
See, e.g., Rachel A. Van Cleave, State ConstitutionalInterpretationand Methodology,
28 N.M. L. REV. 199, 209 (1998); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court:
ContinuingMethodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State ConstitutionalRights
Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1015, 1019 (1997); Jennifer Cutcliffe Juste,
Note, ConstitutionalLaw--The Effect of State ConstitutionalInterpretationon New Mexico's
Civil and Criminal Procedure-Statev. Gomez, 28 N.M. L. REv. 355, 364 (1998).
In Memoriam Honorable RichardJ. Hughes, 136 N.J. XXXI, XLIII (1993).
" In his Essay on Self-Reliance, Ralph Waldo Emerson states: "Insist on yourself;
never imitate. Your own gift you can present every moment with the cumulative
force of a whole life's cultivation; but of the adopted talent of another you have only
an extemporaneous half possession." RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Essay on Self-Reliance,
in THE PORTABLE EMERSON 160 (Carl Bode & Malcolm Cowley eds., Viking Penguin
1981) (1840).
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preeminent. Hunt, like all ofJustice Handler's opinions, is a treasure.
His body of work stands as a monument to reason, which is as much
in his blood and bones as it is in his writings. Oliver Wendell Holmes
may well have been describingJustice Handler when he said:
[Such a person] knows that, a hundred years after he is dead and
forgotten, men who have never heard of him will be moving to
the measure of his thought-the subtle rapture of postponed
power, which the world knows not because it has no external
trappings, but which to his2prophetic vision is more real than that
which commands an army.

With his retirement from the Court, Justice Handler has recently
crossed a threshold into a new life. With his thinking and writing and
his heart, he long ago passed over the lintel into greatness.

29 OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., The Profession of the Law, in THE COLLECTED
WORKS OFJUSTIcE HoLMES 473 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., vol. 3, Univ. of Chicago Press
1995) (1886).

